Regular price: $24.95

Free with 30-day trial
Membership details Membership details
  • A 30-day trial plus your first audiobook, free
  • 1 credit/month after trial – good for any book, any price
  • Easy exchanges – swap any book you don’t love
  • Keep your audiobooks, even if you cancel
  • After your trial, Audible is just $14.95/month
Select or Add a new payment method

Buy Now with 1 Credit

By confirming your purchase, you agree to Audible's Conditions of Use and Amazon's Privacy Notice. Taxes where applicable.

Buy Now for $24.95

Pay using card ending in
By confirming your purchase, you agree to Audible's Conditions of Use and Amazon's Privacy Notice. Taxes where applicable.

Publisher's Summary

This engrossing and meticulously researched volume reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944, defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, the Germans counterattacked. Received wisdom says that Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, and his subsequent failure to concentrate his forces brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German attack. Arguing to the contrary, John A. Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy, refined to reflect developments on the ground, which had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine.
©2010 John Adams (P)2015 Redwood Audiobooks
Show More Show Less

Critic Reviews

"A book that is long overdue." (David Zabecki, author, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmuller and the Birth of Modern Artillery)
Show More Show Less

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful

By Chiefkent on 04-13-16

Not the Smooth Machine of Legend

Much has been made of the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery, and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Too little light has been shed on Bradley and the American Army commanders. Bradley did not serve Eisenhower as well as he could have, and perhaps was not the best man for his position. The man best qualified, (and Marshall's choice for the position), was disliked by Eisenhower, and only entered the ETO after Dragoon. The commanders of Army Group 12 are covered, but not in as great detail.

Eisenhower's strategy for the ETO wasn't the most brilliant militarily, but in all likelihood was the most practical politically. Both of his ground commanders decided to vary from agreed strategy without informing SHAEF. Both, knew that without a major Channel port, there would be a shortage of all supplies D-Day +120. Both angled to get the majority of those supplies. Both were insulted when they didn't get the majority of the supplies.
The blunders made on the Allied side have been omitted from most history books due to political correctness; 'the winners write the history books'. Personalities get lost, hindsight re-writes, winning forgives, (somewhat),

People forget that in WWII the Allies were a coalition and that various commanding officers were reporting to separate governments in addition to their chain of command. Those governments placed additional and extraneous strains on Eisenhower. In addition each countries' military had it's own 'old boy' network, and that's where the senior officers all came from. Mr. Adams gives a reasonable description of most the major players, (on both sides). I'm relatively well read and didn't detect any political slant in the narrative. Jim Wood's narration is invisible.

Read More Hide me
See all Reviews