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In Losing Vietnam, Major General Ira A. Hunt Jr. chronicles the efforts of US military and State Department officials who argued that severe congressional budget reductions ultimately would lead to the defeat of both Cambodia and South Vietnam. As deputy commander of the United States Support Activities Group Headquarters (USAAG) in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, Hunt received all Southeast Asia operational reports, reconnaissance information, and electronic intercepts.
This detailed and fascinating work highlights how analytical studies provided to commanders and staff agencies improved decision making in military operations. By assessing allied capabilities and the strength of enemy operations, Hunt effectively demonstrates that America's lack of financial support and resolve doomed Cambodia and South Vietnam to defeat.
Customer ReviewsMost Helpful
By Kevin Warren on 10-28-17
Know what you're getting
I don't want to give this a bad revietuw because it's not a bad book. It is not loaded with action, drama, etc. but is a very mechanical and dry assessment of the final years of South Vietnam. If you're looking for a gripping action story move on. Frankly I think Hunt 's clear belief that South Vietnam could've held out if we hadn't abandoned them financially off the mark. He seems to be holding on to the idea that it was a military failure and not a political one. So, the reader may finding himself disagreeing with some of Hunt's perspectives but regardless his perspectives are worth knowing (especially since he was there and in command).
By Fred on 06-17-17
A tour de force of the post Paris Agreement military abandonment of Indochina
I originally acquired the audiobook version of Hunt's work. However, it was so full of statistics and and analyses that I purchased a hard copy version. This book is the most complete account of the post-Paris Agreement conflict and battlefield situation I have read to date. It also goes into detail about how the McGovernite Congress' military aid reductions affected the combat capabilities and operations of the South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian forces tactically, operationally and strategically. The book is an important bridge as to what happened between the Peace Agreement to the "Killing Fields" and the "Bamboo Gulag".
Hunt describes through pioneering operational research data, weekly and monthly battlefield situational changes. This book is a true standard by which analyses of the post-1973 Paris Agreement conflict should be measured.